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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in ruling
that Johnson's claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine and the disclaimer of all
implied warranties.
This is an appeal from the trial court's granting of Vermeer's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. This Court reviews the trial court's ruling for correctness. Hunter
v. Sunrise Title Company, 2004 UT r, 84 P.3d 1163, 1165 (Utah 2004).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this
appeal:
Section 70A-2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Utah
legislature, provides in relevant part:
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or
any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case
of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2) (2003).
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Complete texts of these statutes and rules are provided in the Appendix as Exhibit A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C.A. Johnson Trenching, L.C. ("Johnson") purchased a Model T855 Trencher
from Vermeer Manufacturing Company's ("Vermeer") independent, authorized dealer in
Salt Lake City, Utah on July 19, 1999. Johnson alleges that the trencher "became wholly
disabled as a result of a mechanical failure" on September 24, 2002, over three years after
its purchase. Johnson filed a lawsuit against Vermeer relating to the alleged failure of the
subject trencher on March 28, 2003. In its Complaint, Johnson asserted claims for strict
liability, negligence, and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose.
On May 13, 2003, Vermeer filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Johnson's strict liability and negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule;
and (2) Johnson's breach of implied warranty claim was barred because the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were expressly
disclaimed by Vermeer's Limited Warranty for Industrial Equipment.
After full briefing, the District Court Judge, Lynn W. Davis, ruled in favor of
Vermeer and entered an Order Granting Vermeer's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on
July 30, 2003. Johnson now appeals from that Order of Dismissal.1

Johnson appeals the dismissal of its strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims. Johnson does not appeal
the dismissal of its negligence claim. Accordingly, the negligence claim is not addressed here.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 19, 1999, C.A. Johnson Trenching, L.C. purchased a Model T855
trencher, Serial No. 102 (the "trencher"), from Vermeer's independent, authorized dealer
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 5). Upon purchasing the trencher, Johnson received
Vermeer's Limited Warranty for Industrial Equipment ("Limited Warranty"). The
Limited Warranty provides the buyer with a manufacturer's warranty from defects in
material and workmanship, under normal use and service, for one year after delivery to
the owner, or 1000 operating hours, whichever occurs first. (R. 23). A copy of
Vermeer's Limited Warranty is included in the Appendix as Exhibit B.
Vermeer's Limited Warranty expressly disclaims all implied warranties:
This warranty and any possible liability of Vermeer
Manufacturing Company hereunder is in lieu of all other
warranties, express, implied, or statutory, including, but not
limited to, any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose.
(R. 23) (emphasis added). Johnson agreed to the terms of the Limited Warranty
by filling out and signing the Warranty Registration Form. Johnson expressly
acknowledged it was "familiar with the Limited Warranty Statement in the
operator's manual." (R. 21). The Warranty Registration Form is included in the
Appendix as Exhibit C.
On March 28, 2003, Johnson filed a lawsuit alleging the failure of the Model T855
trencher sold by Vermeer's independent, authorized dealer. In its Complaint, Johnson
alleged "the trencher became wholly disabled as a result of a mechanical failure . . . "
over three years after its purchase (R. 4). Johnson asserted causes of action for strict
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liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose
and merchantability. (R. 2-4). Johnson's Complaint sought general and special damages,
including recovery for lost profits. (R. 4). The Complaint did not seek damages with
respect to any personal injuries incurred or damage to any property other than the
trencher itself. See id.
On May 13, 2003, Vermeer filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Johnson's strict liability and negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule;
and (2) Johnson's breach of warranty claim was barred because the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were expressly disclaimed by
Vermeer's Limited Warranty. (R. 9-27).
After full briefing, the District Court Judge, Lynn W. Davis, ruled in favor of
Vermeer and entered an Order Granting Vermeer's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on
July 30, 2003. Johnson now appeals from that Order of Dismissal. (R. 49-50, 62).
Copies of Judge Davis' Ruling on Defendant Vermeer's Motion to Dismiss and Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice are included in the Appendix as Exhibit D.
Johnson now appeals the dismissal of its strict liability and breach of implied
warranty claims. Johnson does not appeal the dismissal of its negligence claim, which
the trial court ruled was also barred by the economic loss rule.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not commit reversible error in finding that Johnson's claims
were barred. Johnson is not entitled to relief under the facts alleged in its Complaint, or
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any set of facts, for two reasons: first, the economic loss rule bars Johnson's strict
liability claim; and second, Johnson's breach of warranty claims are barred because the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were expressly
disclaimed by Vermeer. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling
dismissing Johnson's Complaint with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Economic Loss Rule Bars Johnson's Strict Liability Claim,

Johnson argues that its strict liability claim was improperly dismissed by the trial
court because it properly plead all necessary elements of a strict liability claim under
section 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted by the Utah Supreme Court
in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). Johnson, however, entirely
ignores the complete defense provided by the economic loss rule raised by Vermeer in its
motion to dismiss, and relied upon by the trial court in dismissing Johnson's strict
liability claim. Whether Johnson properly plead the elements for a strict liability claim,
therefore, is irrelevant. The proper issue before the Court is whether the trial court
correctly determined that Johnson's strict liability claim is barred by the economic loss
rule.
Under Utah law, Johnson cannot recover from Vermeer under the theory of strict
liability for economic losses (i.e. lost profits, repair costs to the product itself) because
the economic loss rule precludes recovery of such damages under tort theories of liability.
Utah courts adhere to the majority position that a plaintiff may not recover economic
losses under a theory of non-intentional tort. See American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI
297123.1
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Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); see also, e^g., East River Steamship Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-75 (1986). Economic loss is defined as:
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the
defective product, or consequent loss of profits—without any claim
of personal injury or damage to other property . . . as well as the
"diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in
quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was
manufactured and sold."
American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182
(Utah 1996), quoting Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570,
579-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added). In other words, under Utah law,
economic damages are not recoverable in strict liability absent damage to property other
than the subject product or bodily injury.
Johnson's Complaint sought general and special damages, as well as recovery of
lost profits during the time period that Johnson was allegedly unable to use the trencher
in its normal course of business. (R. 1-3). The Complaint did not seek damages with
respect to any personal injuries incurred by anyone or damage to property other than the
trencher itself. However, Utah law squarely prohibits product purchasers from suing in
tort to recover purely economic losses arising from disputes governed by contract law.
See SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Venutlett & Associates, Inc., 28 P.2d 669 (Utah
2001); American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah
1996).
The seminal case in Utah addressing the application of the economic loss rule is
American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182
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(Utah 1996). In that case, the American Towers Condominium Association filed suit
against a number of defendants, alleging that the defendants negligently failed to properly
design, construct, and supervise the construction of the condominium complex. See id. at
1188. The condominium association claimed economic losses resulting from design and
construction defects in the plumbing and mechanical systems of the condominium
complex, but did not allege personal injury or damage to property apart from the complex
itself. See id. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs negligence claims, stating that "economic damages are not recoverable in [tort]
absent physical property damage or bodily injury." IcL at 1188-92; see also Schafir v.
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that home purchasers could not
recover economic losses based upon defects caused by allegedly negligent construction
of home).
In American Towers, the Utah Supreme Court explained the public policy behind
the economic loss rule as follows:
When a product does not perform or last as long as the consumer
thinks it should, the claim pertains to the quality of the product as
measured by the buyer's and user's expectations—expectations
which emanate solely from the purchase transaction. Thus, contract
principles resolve issues when the product does not meet the user's
expectations, while tort principles resolve issues when the product is
unsafe to person or property.
Id. at 1190. The economic loss rule "arises from intrinsic differences between tort and
contract law." Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 580 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994). "Contract law protects expectancy interests created through agreement
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between the parties, while tort law protects individuals and their property from physical
harm by imposing a duty to exercise reasonable care." Id
Johnson's strict liability claim is precisely the kind of claim that the economic loss
rule is designed to preclude. Johnson purchased a Model T855 trencher that came with a
manufacturer's Limited Warranty for one full year after delivery to the owner, or 1000
operating hours, whichever occurred first. Johnson contends that over three years after
purchase, the trencher "became wholly disabled as a result of a mechanical failure of the
trencher caused by defect flaws in the design." (R. 4). Johnson did not contend that any
physical injuries were sustained as a result of the alleged defect, nor did Johnson seek
reimbursement for any property damage other than damage to the trencher itself. Instead,
Johnson merely sought damages caused by an allegedly defective trencher that became
disabled. These allegations must be adjudicated exclusively in the world of contract and
warranty law. Johnson may not circumvent the legal regime applicable to the purchase of
the trencher by casting its claims in tort. Johnson's strict liability is legally barred.
Hence, the trial court correctly granted Vermeer's motion to dismiss Johnson's strict
liability claim based upon the economic loss rule.
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B.

Vermeer's Limited Warranty Effectively Disclaimed the Implied
Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for a Particular Purpose.

In its Complaint, Johnson asserted a claim for breach of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. However, the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were both expressly disclaimed by
Vermeer in the Limited Warranty that Johnson received and acknowledged on the date
the trencher was purchased.
Section 70A-2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Utah
legislature, provides that "to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must
be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion
must be by a writing and conspicuous." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2) (2003). The
Limited Warranty provides in relevant part, "This warranty and any possible liability of
Vermeer Manufacturing Company hereunder is in lieu of all other warranties, express,
implied, or statutory, including, but not limited to, any warranties of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose." The Limited Warranty conspicuously and expressly
excludes the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability according to the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2).
Moreover, Johnson explicitly agreed to the terms of the limited warranty by filling
out and signing the warranty registration form on the date the trencher was purchased.
2

Paragraph 15 of the Complaint states, "Defendant Vermeer Manufacturing Co.'s trencher was not fit for the
ordinary purpose for which the trencher was to be used and was unmerchantable within the meaning of § 78-2-14
(sic), nor was the gear box, pump and shaft assembly and their component parts fit for the particular purpose for
which they were designed within the meaning of § 70A-2-315." (R. 3).
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By signing the warranty registration form, Johnson, through its agent, expressly
acknowledged familiarity with the Limited Warranty, including the disclaimer of implied
warranties.
Despite this, Johnson argues it never specifically agreed or assented to be bound
by Vermeer's disclaimer. Under Utah law, a disclaimer of warranties is effective where
the seller conspicuously and expressly excludes warranties of fitness and merchantability.
Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, Inc., 681 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1984). To
properly disclaim warranties of merchantability, the disclaimer must specifically mention
merchantability. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2). With respect to warranties of fitness,
"[l]anguage is sufficient to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on
the face hereof" Id. Even where the disclaimer is relatively inconspicuous, the Utah
Supreme Court has explained that the disclaimer will nevertheless be binding on the
buyer if "the provision was actually called to his attention." Christopher v. Larson Ford
Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 1976).
The decision in Rawson v. K & K Sales, Inc., 2001 UT 24, 20 P.2d 876 (Utah
2001) is instructive to the disclaimer issue presented here. In Rawson, plaintiffs James
and Rebecca Rawson purchased a salvage-titled van from defendant K & K Sales.
Plaintiffs signed a sales contract acknowledging the vehicle came with "no warranties,
express or implied, including but not limited to any implied warranty of merchantability
[or] fitness for a particular purpose." Id. at 886. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's grant of defendant's summary judgment motion on plaintiffs' claims for
297123 1
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breach of implied warranties finding that the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose were expressly excluded by disclaimers in the sales
documents plaintiffs signed. Id.
Here, as in Rawson, the language of the disclaimer complies with the requirements
of Section 70A-2-316, and the provision was specifically called to Johnson's attention as
evidenced by the signature of its agent on the warranty registration form. There is no
evidence to suggest that Johnson, a professional trenching company, was unfamiliar
with commercial practices or warranty provisions when it's agent signed the warranty
registration form.
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that where the buyer accepts a
disclaimer in exchange for coverage under the limited warranty, it is binding on the
parties. See Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, 54 P.3d 1131 (finding that disclaimer
was valid where, upon signing the contract, 10 days after tendering purchase price, buyer
became entitled to delivery of goods and coverage under limited warranty). Here,
Johnson signed the warranty registration form, thereby agreeing to the disclaimer of
implied warranties in consideration for coverage under the Limited Warranty.
Under these authorities, the implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose
and merchantability were effectively disclaimed by Vermeer's Limited Warranty.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed Johnson's cause of action for breach of
implied warranties.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly dismissed Johnson's Complaint. Johnson's claims are
legally barred by the economic loss doctrine and disclaimer of implied warranties.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling granting Vermeer's Motion
to Dismiss with Prejudice.
ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Vermeer's
appendix of important documents is bound as part of this brief.

DATED this ffi* day of May, 2004.
Snell & Wilmer LLP

Todd M. Shaughnessy
Kamie F. Brown
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee
Vermeer Manufacturing Co.
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Tab A

1277

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

70A-2-310. Open time for payment or r u n n i n g of credit
— Authority to ship under reservation.
Unless otherwise agreed
(a) payment is due at the time and place at which the
buyer is to receive the goods even though the place of
shipment is the place of delivery; and
(b) if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may
ship them under reservation, and may tender the documents of title, but the buyer may inspect the goods after
their arrival before payment is due unless such inspection
is inconsistent with the terms of the contract (Section
70A-2-513); and
(c) if delivery is authorized and made by way of documents of title otherwise than by Subsection (b) then
payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer
is to receive the documents regardless of where the goods
are to be received; and
(d) where the seller is required or authorized to ship
the goods on credit the credit period runs from the time of
shipment but postdating the invoice or delaying its dispatch will correspondingly delay the starting of the credit
period.

1965

70A-2'311.

Options and cooperation r e s p e c t i n g performance.
(1) An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently
definite (Subsection (3) of Section 76A-2-204) to be a contract
is not made invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of
performance to be specified by one of the parties. Any such
specification must be made in good faith and within limits set
by commercial reasonableness.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating to assortment of the goods are at the buyer's option and except as
otherwise provided in Subsections (l)(c) and (3) of Section
70A-2'319 specifications or arrangements relating to shipment are at the seller's option.
(3) Where such specification would materially affect the
other party's performance but is not seasonably made or
where one party's cooperation is necessary to the agreed
performance of the other but is not seasonably forthcoming,
the other party in addition to all other remedies
(a) is excused for any resulting delay in his own performance; and
(b) may also either proceed to perform in any reasonable manner or after the time for a material part of his
own performance treat the failure to specify or to cooperate as a breach by failure to deliver or accept the goods.
1965

70A-2-312. Warranty of title and against infringement
— Buyer's obligation against infringement.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a
warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer
rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security
interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer
at the time of contracting "has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty imder Subsection (1) will be excluded or
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which
give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not
claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such
right or title as he or a third person may have.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant
regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods
shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person
by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes
specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless
against any such claim which arises out of compliance with
the specifications.
1965

70A-2-316

70A-2--313. Express w a r r a n t i e s by affirmation, promise, description, sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole
of the goods shall conform to the sample or model
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
1965
70A-2-314. Implied warranty — Merchantability — Usage of trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316), a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value
of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or
elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average
quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit
and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as
the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made
on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316) other
implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage
of trade.
1965
70A-2-315. Implied warranty — Fitness for particular
purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know 9-^-Y particular purpose for which the goods are required
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
1965
70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties —
Livestock.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 70A-2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing

A-2-317

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

1 conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties
itness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
•eof."

3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as
is," "with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as
he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.
i) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in
ordance with the provisions of this chapter on liquidation
[imitation of damages and on contractual modification of
ledy (Sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719).
5) If a contract for the sale of livestock, which may include
tie, hogs, sheep, and horses, does not contain a written
tement as to warranty of merchantability or fitness for a
ticular purpose, there shall be no implied warranty that
livestock are free from disease and sickness at the time of
sale and the seller shall not be liable for damages arising
-n the lack of merchantability or fitness for a particular
•pose.

1981

^-2-317. C u m u l a t i o n a n d conflict of w a r r a n t i e s express or implied.
Varranties whether express or implied shall be construed
consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such
struction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall
ermine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that
2ntion the following rules apply:
(a) Exact of technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied
warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.
1965
^-2-318. T h i r d - p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r i e s of w a r r a n t i e s express or implied.
i seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
r person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume
)e affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the
rranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
3 section with respect to injury to the person of an individto whom the warranty extends.
1977
^-2-319. F.O.B. a n d F.A.S. t e r m s .
1) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means
>e on board") at a named place, even though used only in
nection with the stated price, is a delivery term under
ich
(a) when the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, the
seller must at that place ship the goods in the manner
provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-504) and bear the
expense and risk of putting them into the possession of
the carrier; or
(b) when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the
seller must at his own expense and risk transport the
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goods to that place and there tender delivery of them in
the m a n n e r provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-503)(c) when under either (a) or (b) the term is also F.O.B.
vessel, car or other vehicle, the seller must in addition at
his own expense and risk load the goods on board. If the
term is F.O.B. vessel the buyer must name the vessel and
in an appropriate case the seller must comply with the
provisions of this chapter on the form of bill of lading
(Section 70A-2-323).
(2) Unless otherwise agreed the term FA.S. vessel (which
means "free alongside") at a named port, even though used
only in connection with the stated price, is a delivery term
under which the seller must
(a) at his own expense and risk deliver the goods
alongside the vessel in the manner usual in that port or on
a dock designated and provided by the buyer; and
(b) obtain and tender a receipt for the goods in exchange for which the carrier is under a duty to issue a bill
of lading.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed in any case falling within
Subsection (l)(a) or (c) or Subsection (2) the buyer must
seasonably give any needed instructions for making delivery,
including when the term is FA.S. or F.O.B. -the loading berth
of the vessel and in an appropriate case its name and sailing
date. The seller may treat the failure of needed instructions as
a failure of co-operation under this chapter (Section 70A-2311). He may also at his option move the goods in any
reasonable manner preparatory to delivery or shipment.
(4) Under the term F.O.B. vessel or FA.S. unless otherwise
agreed the buyer must make payment against tender of the
required documents and the seller may not tender nor the
buyer demand delivery of the goods in substitution for the
documents.
1965
70A-2-320. C.I.F. a n d C.&F. t e r m s .
(1) The term C.I.F. means that the price includes in a lump
sum the cost of the goods and the insurance and freight to the
named destination. The term C.&F. or C.F. means that the
price so includes cost and freight to the named destination.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed and even though used only in
connection with the stated price and destination, the term
C.I.F. destination or its equivalent requires the seller at his
own expense and risk to
(a) put the goods into the possession of a carrier at the
port for shipment and obtain a negotiable bill or bills of
lading covering the entire transportation to the named
destination; and
(b) load the goods and obtain a receipt from the carrier
(which may be contained in the bill of lading) showing
that the freight has been paid or provided for; and
(c) obtain a policy or certificate of insurance, including
any war risk insurance, of a kind and on terms then
current at the port of shipment in the usual amount, m
the currency of the contract, shown to cover the same
goods covered by the bill of lading and providing for
payment of loss to the order of the buyer or for the account
of whom it may concern; but the seller may add to the
price the amount of the premium for any such war risk
insurance; and
(d) prepare an invoice of the goods and procure any
other documents required to effect shipment or to comply
with the contract; and
(e) forward and tender with commercial promptness all
the documents in due form and with any indorsement
necessary to perfect the buyer's rights.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed the term C.&F or its equivalent has the same effect and imposes upon the seller the same
obligations and risks as a C.I.F. term except the obligation as
to insurance.

C i t e d in Walker v. Carlson, 740 R2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v.
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah

Ct. App. 1994); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); Stavros v. Office of Legislative Research & Gen. Counsel, 2000 UT 63,
15 P.3d 1013.
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Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for
securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
infliction of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R.
Fed. 442.
Imposition of sanctions u n d e r Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in antitrust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573.
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state.
A party serv-ed with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer t h a n all of the claims in a
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days
after notice of the court's action;
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insuflSciency of process, (5) insufficiency of

service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems
just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion,
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.

(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When t h e plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, t h e defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the.
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.)
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amendment in Subdivision (a) added the language
beginning "within the state and within thirty
days" at the end of the first sentence and "but a
motion directed" at the end of the last sentence,

and made stylistic changes throughout,
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 12, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Motions generally,
U.R.C.P. 7.
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Cited.
J u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p e r s o n .
When urging the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction based only on documentary
evidence, a plaintiff m u s t make only a prima
facie showing that the trial court has personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807
P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S.
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991).
Trial court erred in granting a Nevada casino's motion to dismiss a U t a h patron's personal
injury suit, where the patron's complaint alleged sufficient facts to support general personal jurisdiction over the casino by the State of
Utah. Ho v. Jim's Enters., Inc., 2001 UT 63, 29
P.3d 633.
Motion for j u d g m e n t o n p l e a d i n g s .
Motion for judgment on the pleadings to
decide upon distribution of trust assets was
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust beneficiaries to determine distribution and offsets.
Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d
233.
—Matters o u t s i d e of p l e a d i n g s .
A n s w e r s to i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s .
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of

vere properly set aside where trial court failed
o obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
lummons was not timely issued Fibreboard
3
aper Piods Corp v Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
*75 P 2 d 1005 (1970)
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground t h a t their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance m another court on that
late, but due to fact that there were no law or
notion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, rePusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v
Hammon, 560 P 2 d 1375 (Utah 1977)

T i m e for a p p e a l .
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran from
the date of notice of entry of such judgment,
rather t h a n from the date of judgment Buckn e r v Mam Realty & Ins Co , 4 Utah 2d 124,
288 P2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank &
T r U s t Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)
C i t e d in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2 d 703 (1965),
J P W Enters , Inc v Naef, 604 P 2 d 486 (Utah
1979), Katz v Pierce, 732 P 2 d 92 (Utah 1986),
Lund v Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P 3 d 277
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A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to
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A L R 3d 1070
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusmg to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R 3d
1272
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and

hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A L R 3d 586
Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A L R 3d 1255
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only by
custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served m accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show t h a t there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and w h a t material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts t h a t appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, m u s t set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion t h a t he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fe-es, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F R C P .

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Contempt generally,
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq
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Introduction

VERMEER EQUIPMENT LIMITED WARRANTY
VERMEER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Manufacturer", warrants each
new industrial product of its own manufacture to be free from defects in material and workmanship, under normal
use and service for one full year after delivery to the owner or 1000 operating hours, whichever occurs first. During
the warranty period, the authorized selling Vermeer Dealer shall furnish parts without charge for any Vermeer
product that fails because of defects in material and workmanship. Warranty is void unless warranty registration
card is returned within ten days from the date of purchase. This warranty and any passible liability of Vermeer
Manufacturing Company hereunder is in lieu of all other warranties, express, implied, or statutory, including, but not
limited to, any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
The parties agree that the Buyer's SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY against Manufacturer, whether in contract or
arising out of warranties, representations, instructions, or defects shall be for the replacement or repair of defective
parts as provided herein. In no event shall Manufacturer's liability exceed the purchase price of the product. The
Buyer agrees that no other remedy (including, but not limited to, incidental or consequential loss) shall be available
to him. if, during the warranty period, any product becomes defective by reason of material or workmanship and
Buyer immediately notifies Manufacturer of such defect, Manufacturer shall, at its option, supply a replacement part
or request return of the product to its plant in Pella, Iowa. Wo parts shall be returned without prior written
authorization From Manufacturer, and this Warranty does not obligate the Manufacturer to bear any transportaton
charges in connection with the repair or replacement of defective parts. The Vermeer Manufacturing Company will
not accept any charges for labor and/or parts incidental to the removal or remounting of parts repaired or replaced
under this Warranty.
This Warranty shall not apply to any pari or product which shall have been installed or operated in a manner not
recommended by the Vermeer Manufacturing Company, nor to any part or product which shall have been
neglected, or used in any way which, in the Manufacturer's opinion, adversely affects its performance; nor
negligence of proper maintenance or other negligence, fire or other accident; nor with respect to wear items
included but not limited to items such as backhoe bucket teeth, digger chain, sprocket, cutters and bases, dirt
augers and sprocket, drive chains and sprockets, plow blades, seats, brake pads, cutter wheel and segments,
trench cleaners, tree spade blades and wear strips, stump cutter wheel, pockets and teeth, brush chipper knives,
fan belts, water hoses, lights on light kits; nor if the unit has been altered or repaired outside of a Vermeer
Manufacturing Company authorized dealership in a manner of which, in the sole judgment of Vermeer
Manufacturing Company affects its performance, stability or reliability; nor with respect to batteries which are
covered under a separate adjustment warranty; nor to any product in which parts not manufactured or approved by
the Manufacturer have been used, nor to normal maintenance services or replacement of normal service items.
Equipment and accessories not of our manufacture are warranted only to the extent of the original Manufacturer's
Warranty and subject to their allowance to us, if found defective by them.
Vermeer Manufacturing Company reserves the right to modify, alter, and improve any product or parts without
incurring any obligation to replace any product or parts previously sold with such modified, altered, or improved
product or part.
No person is authorized to give any other Warranty, or to assume any additionaJ obligation on the Manufacturer's
behalf unless made in wnting, and signed by an officer of the Manufacturer.
VERMEER MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Pella, Iowa

T855 Trencher
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LIMITED WARRANTY FOR INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

Model,

Customer Type _i_

. Pnmary Use.
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(See Market Claserficabans Below)
NOTE; To validate warranty coverage, thra form must be
filed out, 3ignedr and returned at the tms of delivery to first
owner. This report will not be acceptable if incomplete or
falsified in any way.
~y_ i &^ {\&
Delivery date
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I trie owner, hereby acknowledge that
(have rece«vBd and willreadtfm operator's manual
before operating or Servicing the machine.
1 have road and understand trie Mriety deoate on
the machine and safety fnstaictians In tha manual.
ThB daaiflr explained safety, operation, and service
Of tha machine.
f amfemiliarwith the Limited Warranty Statement
In tha operator's manual.
I have bean rad vised and understand that dealers
are Independent dealers and not agents or
employees of Varrnaer Msnufactunng Company
and therefore hava no authority to make
representations
on behalf
of Varrnaer
Manufacturing Corrrp/iay.
Owners Signature ~}lf^"*r
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I. tha deader, acknowledge that:
l have provided the owner with tha operator's
manual and have Instructed him concerning safety,
proper operation, service, and tha Limited
Warranty of the machine.
\\
I have examined the machine according to the
predelivery check sheet contained in the operator's
manual and, having made ail neceaasry
adjustments, find the machine ready for customer
fleid use.
j
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Defter signature
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IN THE FOURTH JTJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
C A JOHNSON TRENCHING, L C,
Plaintiff,
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs
VERMEER MANUFACTURING CO,
Defendant

Civil No 030401491
Judge Lynn W Davis

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss The Court havinj
read the Motions of the Parties now makes the following ruling
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1 Plaintiff C A Johnson Trenching, L C purchased a Model T855 trencher, Serial No
102, from defendant Vermeer Manufacturing Company's mdependent authorized dealer in Salt
Lake City on July 19, 1999
2 On March 28, 2003, plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that the Model T855 trencher
sold by Vermeer's independent authorized dealer m Salt Lake City "became wholly disabled as a
result of mechanical failure" on September 24, 2002, over three years after it purchase
ANALYSIS
It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot recover economic losses for strict liability or
negligence claims absent damage to property other than the subject product or bodily injury
American Towers Owners Association Inc v CCI Mechanical Inc , 930 P 2d 1182 (Utah 1996]
In this case, plaintiff does not allege property damage or bodily injury As such plaintiffs claim
for economic loss under the theories of strict liability and negligence fails

Section 70A-2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Utah legislature,
provides that "to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by writing and
conspicuous." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2) (2002). In this case, the limited warranty signed
by the plaintiff expressly disclaims the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The plaintiff offered no case law to refuie the proper
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. Furthermore, the defendant properly followed the directives of the Uniform
Commercial Code and specifically mentioned in writing the two implied warranties.
CONCLUSION AND RULING
Because the Court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
defendant Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

DATED this / /

day of July, 2003.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 03 0401491 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

day

J

aae _

isr"

NAME
KAMIE F BROWN
ATTORNEY DEF
15 WEST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 12 0 0
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
THOMAS W SEILER
ATTORNEY PLA
8 0 NORTH 100 EAST
P.O. BOX 1266
PROVO UT 84603-1266

Todd M. Shaughnessy (6651)
Kamie F Brown (8520)
Snell & Wilmer LLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800
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Attorneys for Defendant Vermeer Manufacturing Co.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
C.A. JOHNSON TRENCHING, L.C ,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
Case No. 030401491
vs.

Division 9
VERMEER MAMJFACTURTNG CO.,
Defendant.
Based upon the motion of Defendant Vermeer Manufacturing, Co , supporting and
opposing papers, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion be and hereby is granted, and that
the above-captioned matter be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 30

day of July, 2002

pM^AL. IF /fy

BY THE CO'

Approval as to Form:

Thomas W. Seller
.10BJNSON SELLER &. GLAZIER
»o03ia

